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CRYPTANALYSIS OF HFE
ILIA TOLI
Abstract. I transform the trapdoor problem ofHFE into a linear
algebra problem.
1. Introduction
The problem of solving systems of multivariate polynomial equations
is a well-known hard problem. In complexity theory, it is well-known to
be an NP-complete problem. Furthermore, even if we limit ourselves
to the problem of solving systems of multivariate polynomial of degree
two equations, we have again an NP-complete problem. Therefore, it
has been paid a lot of attention, since the invention of the idea of the
PK cryptography, by Diffie and Hellman [DH76].
A lot of cryptosystems have been proposed since then, where an
eavesdropper is asked to accomplish the hard task of solving systems
of quadratic equations. However, most of them had short lives. The
information that an eavesdropper had on the shape of the private key
usually sufficed to compromise the security. Some of their cryptanalyses
aimed to recover the private key, or something equivalent, in the sense
that gives the same privileges. Other cryptanalyses reduce the problem
to accessible exhaustive searches, and so on. Recall that the ultimate
task of the cryptanalysis is recovering cleartexts rather than recovering
meticulously the whole set of the numberlets of the PK [COU].
In this paper we focus on HFE . It is a PK cryptosystem first pro-
posed by Patarin [Pat96]. It is one of the modifications of a cryp-
tosystem first proposed by Imai and Matsumoto [IM85], after having
successfully cryptanalyzed it.
In its main version, its PK is a system of n quadratic polynomial
equations in n variables with coefficients in a finite field Fq, practically
F2. Its private key is:
• a basis, up to an isomorphism, of an overfield K ⊃ Fq, [K :
Fq] = n, as an Fq-vector space;
• a single univariate polynomial f of a certain form, with coeffi-
cients in K;
• two invertible affine transformations of K.
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Practically, p = q = 2. However, cryptosystems can be set up for
any choice of p, q. For simplicity, hereon we assume only that p = q.
The other case can be treated almost identically.
In the our cryptanalysis, we find another sparse univariate polyno-
mial, such that its knowledge reduces eavesdropping to the task of
solving a single univariate polynomial equation. Its solving in general
is an NP-complete problem. Due to its further structure, in the case
of HFE its solving is a pure linear algebra matter.
We call the single polynomial that we find in public an alias of the
PK. All of the task of recovering it can be performed within O(n6)
bit operations. Recall that n is actually the only security parameter to
the legitimate user, and that the trapdoor problem is subexponential
in it.
We assume that the reader is already familiar with HFE .
Most of the symbolic manipulations throughout this paper are done
by means of Singular, Macaulay2, and CoCoA. If there ever are any
calculus mistakes, it is because of the little part done by hand. In any
case, the calculus errors in the examples do not prejudice the algorithms
they illustrate.
2. The Cryptosystem
Let the parties committed to the tasks be:
• Alice who wants to receive secure messages;
• Bob who wants to send her secure messages;
• Eve, the eavesdropper.
Alice chooses two finite fields Fq < K, and a basis β1, β2, . . . , βn of K
as an Fq-vector space. In practice, q = 2. However, it can be any p
r,
for any p prime, and any r ∈ N.
Next she takes a univariate polynomial of the form:
(1) f(x) =
∑
i,j
γijx
q
θij+q
ϕij
+
∑
i
αix
qξi + µ0,
with coefficients in K, and two affine transformations: S, T : K → K;
one left, one right. Let ∂f be the degree (private data) of f(x).
With manipulations that we skip in order to save space, she generates
her PK; a set of n quadratic polynomials of degree two, in n variables.
The interested reader may find details in [IM85, IM89, hfe, Tol03].
Her private key is:
• the basis B of K as an Fq-vector space;
• S, f , T .
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3. The Cryptanalysis
Applying invertible affine transformations is equivalent to compos-
ing with permutation affine polynomials. So, Eve knows that S ◦ f ◦ T
in K[x] is a certain univariate polynomial of the same form like (1), but
generally of an enormous degree. This is easily seen if one observes the
general form of such a compositum. So, S ◦ f ◦ T is rather sparse, too.
Let S, T denote the affine polynomials corresponding to the respec-
tive affine transformations, too. Eve can represent:
(2) T = t+ t0x
p0 + . . . tn−1x
pn−1 = (x+ t)◦ (t0x
p0 + · · ·+ tn−1x
pn−1).
Next, Eve knows that S is a permutation polynomial. So, it has a
single root. Let it be s′. So, we have:
(3) S = s+s0x
p0+· · ·+sn−1x
pn−1 = (s0x
p0+· · ·+sn−1x
pn−1)◦(x−s′).
So, Eve can think of S ◦ f ◦ T to be of the form:
(s0x
p0 + · · ·+ sn−1x
pn−1)◦ (x−s′)◦f ◦ (x+ t)◦ (t0x
p0 + · · ·+ tn−1x
pn−1).
It is easily seen that the polynomial F = (x + s′) ◦ f ◦ (x + t) is
another polynomial of the same shape and degree of f . So, Eve may
assume that the transformations S and T really are linear rather than
affine, and that the private polynomial is a certain F . She can omit
the translations without any loss.
Let Eve fix the canonical basis of K, or a basis at her choice, too. She
may assume to apply a nondegenerate linear transformation L (that
she does not know, but she need not) to the private basis B of K, and
to S ◦ f ◦ T in K[x]. So, she obtains the canonical basis I of K, and
another univariate pseudoquadratic polynomial A = S ◦ f ◦ T ◦ L. As
T ◦ L is just another linear transformation, Eve can assume that she
knows the basis, and the polynomial is of the form S ◦ f ◦ T .
Definition 3.1. The Hamming weight of a univariate polynomial is the
maximum of the Hamming weights of the exponents of the monomials
with nonzero coefficients.
In order to calculate this single univariate public polynomial S◦f ◦T ,
Eve writes down the pseudoquadratic polynomial of degree at most
qn − 1 in its general form:
(4) Adx
d + Ad−1x
d−1 + · · ·+ A1x+ A0,
where she considers the Ai like variables. She includes in such a poly-
nomial only monomials which’s exponents have Hamming weight at
most two. So, her number of variables is at most n
2+n
2
+ n.
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Next, Eve has to do at most n
2+n
2
+n evaluations to the PK. So, she
obtains a linear system of at most n
2+n
2
+ n equations in the n
2+n
2
+ n
variables Ai. Solving it in K enables Eve to recover A = S ◦ f ◦ T
in the form of a univariate polynomial with coefficients in K. It is a
public knowledge that A(x) exists, and is unique. So, we expect that
the n
2+n
2
+ n evaluations are necessary and sufficient.
Now Eve has reduced eavesdropping problem to the problem of solv-
ing a single univariate polynomial equation of a certain form and struc-
ture within its field of coefficients. She possesses the private key, indeed
an alias of its. The only problem to Eve is that such a polynomial gen-
erally is of a huge degree. However, Eve knows that it is isomorphic to
a very low degree polynomial of a certain form.
Definition 3.2. Two polynomials a(x), b(x) ∈ Fq[x]/(x
q − x) are
called isomorphic iff there exists a permutation polynomial c(x) such
that a(x) = b ◦ c(x) mod (xq − x) or a(x) = c ◦ b(x) mod (xq − x).
It is obvious that the above definition sets up an equivalence relation
in the ring Fq[x]/(x
q − x).
Let us now split both the private and the public polynomials f and A
into three pieces: the quadratic part, the linear part, and the constant
term. Our important observation here is that the linear transforma-
tions sends the quadratic part of f into the quadratic part of A; the
linear part of f into the linear part of A, and the constant term of f to
the constant term of A isomorphically and separately; without stirring
the parts. Besides, none of the transformations changes the constant
part. So, we assume the constant part of the polynomial we are looking
for to be known.
The quadratic and linear part of A define respectively a quadratic
and a linear form: Q,L : Kn −→ K. The compositions of f with the
matrices S, T bring the respective forms into new forms. So, such
compositions correspond to joint bases change for these forms.
The important observations of the paragraph above will help us to
bring the trapdoor problem into a pure linear algebra problem.
Let us get rid for now of the constant part, and pick it up for last.
We write down their matrices. In characteristic two, the formula
that associates a symmetric bilinear form (i.e., a symmetric matrix) to
the quadratic form is:
(5) b(x, y) = q(x+ y) + q(x) + q(y).
Alice has limitations on the degree d of f . Indeed, if it is too big,
the number of the undesired solutions grows a lot. Besides, if she goes
far away with d, the problem becomes hard to her, too. In any case, all
what we are looking for, is to render Eve’s position as good as Alice’s.
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Therefore, we know that the matrix of the quadratic form of the
public polynomial has a tiny rank. We bring it into the canonical
form. This process corresponds to a basis change of Kn for A. We
apply the same basis change to the matrix of the linear form.
Up to now, we have obtained two matrices, transpose, (those that
bring the quadratic polynomial into the canonical form), and a polyno-
mial. The polynomial is the sum of the associated polynomials to the
matrices of the new quadratic and linear forms, and of the constant
part. This polynomial has exactly as many quadratic monomials as f
does. The problem now are the monomials of the linear part. They
generally still preserve their huge degree.
Well, it is a public knowledge that we can apply to the new linear
form matrix a basis change that brings most of its into the canonical
form, apart the minor of its in the same position with the nonzero
minor of the new quadratic matrix. Doing so, and applying the same
basis change to the quadratic matrix, we get rid of most of the linear
monomials, too, and do not cause any change to the quadratic polyno-
mial. The new polynomial associated to the new quadratic and linear
matrices is more or less of the same degree as f . So, Eve is able to
solve it.
So, she has a polynomial and two matrices that indeed put her in
the same position with Alice in decryption. This completes breaking
HFE .
Remark 3.3. The matrices that Eve finds are with coefficients in K.
Those of Alice instead, with coefficients in F. This is not any sort of
problem. Besides, it is a public knowledge that Eve should as well limit
herself to transformations with coefficients in F, and obtain an alias of
the key, anyway. In practice, there is no reason to do so.
3.1. For most of the rest of this paper we give a step-by-step example
of how do we practically recover A(x), and then on how do we actually
choose well a pair of linear transformations that enable us to solve it.
4. A Toy Example
We are given the following toy PK from Wolf [Wol03]:
(6)


x1 + x3 + x1x2 + x1x3 + x2x3
x3 + x1x3 + x2x3
x1 + x2 + x3 + x1x2 + x2x3 + 1.
All what we know besides the PK equations, is that the base field is
F2, and that the degree of field extension is 3. In some fashion, we will
have these data public. Without them, Bob will be unable to encrypt.
We fix the basis t2, t, 1 of K = F23 as an F2-vector space. We choose
it at our pleasure. We take K = F2[t]/(t
3 + t + 1). Again, we choose
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the irreducible polynomial of degree n from F2[t] for generating K at
our pleasure.
Now we write the general form of the polynomial we are looking for;
an alias of the private polynomial f . It has at most 32 = 9 terms.
Explicitely, in this case it is of the form:
(7) a+ bx+ cx2 + dx3 + ex4 + fx5 + gx6.
Now we evaluate the PK in 7 points: x = 0, 1, t, t+1, t2, t2+1, t2+ t.
The toy values of the parameters render the wrong idea that we will
have to evaluate a generic-coefficients polynomial in the whole set of
the elements of the overfield. Indeed, it is very far from being like that.
We need only n2 evaluations. Card K = pn, instead.
From the evaluations we obtain the following system:


a = 1
a+ b+ c+ d+ e+ f + g = t2
a+ tb+ t2c+ (t+ 1)d+ (t2 + t)e+ (t2 + t+ 1)f + (t2 + 1)g = 0
a+ (t + 1)b+ (t2 + 1)c+ t2d+ (t2 + t+ 1)e+ tf + (t2 + 1)g = 0
a+ t2b+ (t2 + t)c + (t2 + 1)d+ te + (t+ 1)f + (t2 + t + 1)g = t2
a+ (t2 + 1)b+ (t2 + t + 1)c+ (t2 + t)d+ (t+ 1)e + t2f + tg = t2 + 1
a+ (t2 + t)b+ tc+ (t2 + t+ 1)d+ t2e+ (t2 + 1)f + (t + 1)g = 1.
We solve this system, and find the our alias key:
(8) A(x) = t2x6+(t2+1)x5+(t2+ t+1)x4+(t2+1)x3+(t2+ t)x2+1.
As the polynomial we are looking for is unique, the solution to the
system above exists, and is unique. Now Eve has only to solve the
equation A(x) = y in order to recover x. Even though it is of an
enormous degree, the number of solutions that Eve finds is equal to
those that Alice is expected to find. This is a public knowledge. Eve,
too, can descard undesired solutions by the same means that Alice does.
Much the same like Alice. The last task for Eve is that of recovering
two suitable matrices that lower the degree of A(x).
5. Conclusions
5.1. In HFE the PK hides a single univariate pseudoquadratic poly-
nomial. In any fashion, this polynomial is very sparse. It has at most
n2+n
2
+ n terms of a certain well-known shape. So, in any case, Eve
can recover it in O(n6) bit operations, for n the degree of the field
extension. Recall that n is Alice’s only security parameter, and that
the trapdoor problem is already only subexponentially harder with it.
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5.2. Even if we take the private polynomial to be of higher Hamming
weight, the amount of calculi required to recover it is almost the same.
Recall that the size of the PK is already almost impractical.
5.3. The problem of solving a single univariate pseudoquadratic poly-
nomial equation upon finite fields is an NP-complete problem [KS99].
So, it is reasonable to look for cryptosystems that provide it as a trap-
door problem. The experience up to now has shown that hiding poly-
nomials does not help the security of a cryptosystem, restricts choices,
and renders the size of the PK impractical. The privileged position of
a legitimate user must rely elsewhere.
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